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Abstract 
Heightened attention is being paid to the Northwest Passage, the waters that flow among the 
islands of northern Canada and that, in the next decades, may be amenable to commercial 
navigation. Most debates regarding the Passage’s legal status focus on Canada’s contention that 
it is its internal waters and the United States’ contention that it is an international strait. This 
article proposes that a designation of the Passage as Canada’s territorial sea would be as legally 
robust as the internal waters or international strait designations while satisfying both Canada’s 
and the United States’ political objectives. 
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I. Introduction 
In The Odyssey, the goddess Circe cautioned Odysseus that there was no safe route through the 
dangerous strait that he was preparing to traverse. To one side lay Scylla, a monster who was 
known to grab sailors, six at a time, from each passing ship. To the other side lay Charybdis, a 
treacherous whirlpool. Circe advised Odysseus that, since there was no way of avoiding both 
hazards, he would do best to sail quickly by Scylla, so that his loss would be limited to six sailors. 
Any attempt to fight Scylla would just lead to the loss of more men, while steering toward 
Charybdis would doom the entire ship.  
Echoing Circe’s warning to Odysseus, would-be legal navigators of the Northwest 
Passage are typically warned of two dangers: the Scylla of the transit passage regime that the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies to international straits and 
the Charybdis of enclosure as Canada’s historic internal waters. Canadian authors generally warn 
that the transit passage regime is legally inappropriate for the Northwest Passage and that its 
application could bring about an era of unregulated shipping through waters that are 
environmentally sensitive, culturally significant, and militarily vulnerable (e.g. Byers, 2009; 
Byers and Lalonde, 2009; Huebert, 2003; Pharand, 2007). Conversely, U.S.-based scholars 
caution that the internal waters designation could set an unwanted precedent for enclosing key 
navigational straits around the world (e.g. Kraska, 2007; 2009). While an abstract ideal might be 
to steer a course that avoids both dangers, the policy options for the Northwest Passage, as for 
Odysseus, are typically portrayed as limited to one of these two extremes.  
In fact, several commentators on the Northwest Passage dispute have noted that it is 
unlikely that either acceptance of Canada’s internal waters claim or acceptance of the United 
States’ assertion that the waters constitute an international strait would lead to catastrophic 
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consequences on the scale of those faced by Odysseus in his choice between Scylla and 
Charybdis. Legal scholars note that enclosure of the Passage within Canada’s internal waters 
likely would not lead to a significant restriction of navigational access in northern Canada, let 
alone the rest of the world. In fact, it might encourage Canada to invest in transport infrastructure, 
which would increase use. Conversely, the international straits designation would not necessarily 
leave the waters without any regulatory framework (Lalonde and Lasserre, 2013; McDorman, 
2009; McRae, 2007). Nonetheless the perception that such potentials exist amplifies the debate 
and thereby diminishes the prospects for a mutually acceptable solution.   
This article suggests a way to break this stalemate that has received surprisingly little 
attention in the legal literature: classifying the Northwest Passage (and, more broadly, the waters 
that separate Canada’s northern islands) neither as Canada’s internal waters nor as an 
international strait but instead designating them as being part of Canada’s territorial sea. This 
third path – a middle route through the Northwest Passage that steers between the Scylla and 
Charybdis of the internal waters and international strait designations – is legally justifiable, 
compatible with the policy needs of each country, and potentially achievable politically. 
II. Classifying Water: Internal, International, and Territorial 
Since August 2007, when, for a brief period, the waters of the Northwest Passage first became 
navigable by ship without the assistance of icebreaking vessels, the scholarly and popular media 
have been abuzz with questions concerning the geopolitical and legal challenges that would arise 
were these waters to form a commercially viable long-distance transit route, realizing a dream 
that has long driven European imaginations of North America. The prospective emergence of a 
navigable maritime corridor among the Canadian islands, connecting the Atlantic with the Arctic 
and ultimately the Pacific Ocean has resonated, in particular, with Canadians, for whom the 
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Northwest Passage plays an important role in stories of the nation’s foundation (Grace, 2001) 
and who recognize that the Northwest Passage could be a source of both economic opportunity 
and environmental risk (Evans, 2012). 
Coincidentally, just three weeks before the Passage was declared to be navigable, a 
Russian-led team planted that country’s flag on the seabed at the North Pole. Although the 
intended message of the flag-planting and its connection with Russia’s ongoing efforts at 
mapping its continental shelf remain debated to this day, it seems clear that the event had nothing 
to do with navigational rights, either in the Northwest Passage or anywhere else in the Arctic 
(Steinberg, 2010). Nonetheless the coincidence of the two events facilitated public concern about 
a “scramble” for increasingly valuable Arctic resources, including the resource of transportation 
(e.g. Fairhall, 2010; Howard, 2010; Romaniuk, 2012; Sale and Potapov, 2009; Zellen, 2009) and 
this served to reaffirm the contextualization of the Northwest Passage legal status issue within 
politically contentious debates concerning the future of State sovereignty in the Arctic (Gerhardt 
et al., 2010). 
Tensions in the region increased further in May 2008, when representatives of the five 
Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States) met in Ilulissat, Greenland. Although the Ilulissat meeting was intended to demonstrate 
that no “scramble for the Arctic” was occurring and that the region was being governed through 
the application of established mechanisms of State territoriality (on land) and the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (on water), the meeting inadvertantly gave the impression that 
the “Arctic Five” were seizing the region (including, potentially, its waters) and closing it off to 
any form of collective governance. Whether actors beyond the Arctic Five actually perceived the 
Ilulissat meeting as an exclusionary power grab or whether they merely seized upon this 
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narrative as a pretext, the aftermath of the meeting saw others with an interest in the region 
reaffirming their intent to play a role in determining its future, whether through public 
proclamations (e.g. the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s Declarations on Sovereignty and Resource 
Development), issue-oriented campaigns (e.g. Greenpeace’s “I  Arctic” project), or attempts to 
gain higher status representation at international meetings (e.g. the efforts of non-Arctic states to 
gain permanent observer status within the Arctic Council) (Steinberg et al., 2014).  
Although most narratives of impending conflict in the Arctic have centered on access to 
outer continental shelf seabed minerals and, to a lesser extent, fisheries, debates about the 
region’s governance impact shipping as well. Long-distance shipping States express concern that 
political turbulence in the region could lead to their losing control over navigational freedoms, 
and coastal States, conversely, fear that this same turbulence could interfere with their ability to 
regulate transit through coastal waters. These concerns have been most prevalent in the waters of 
the Northwest Passage, with the key protagonists being Canada and the United States.
1
 
A. Internal Waters 
Canada has long held that the waters that flow between its northern islands (i.e. the waters that 
constitute the various routes of the Northwest Passage) are its internal waters. In the early 20
th
 
century, some in Canada asserted that the country’s territorial borders should take the form of a 
wedge-shaped sector that would extend to the North Pole from the easternmost and westernmost 
points on the northern coast of the Canadian mainland (Dufresne, 2007; Pharand, 1988). This 
territorial claim, which effectively was based on geographic coordinates without regard to 
whether the points within those coordinates were land (which normally can be claimed as 
sovereign territory) or water (which normally cannot), was always questionable under 
international law. Nonetheless, the sectoral claim was reiterated by Lester Pearson (then 
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Ambassador to the United States) in 1946 when he stated, “[The Canadian Arctic] includes not 
only Canada’s northern mainland but the islands and the frozen sea north of the mainland 
between the meridians of its east and west boundaries, extended to the North Pole” (quoted in 
Pharand, 1988, 54). The sentiment, extending Canada’s Arctic territorial rights over water as 
well as land, and up to the North Pole, was further implied by then Foreign Minister Peter 
MacKay in his reactions to the 2007 Russian flag planting, when he responded, “We established 
a long time ago that these were Canadian waters and this is Canadian property” and “The 
question of sovereignty in the Arctic is not a question. It’s clear. It’s our country, it’s our 
property, it’s our water…. The Arctic is Canadian” (quoted in Steinberg, 2010, 83). Indeed, 
sectoral boundary lines still appear on maps in the Canadian government’s National Atlas of 
Canada (Natural Resources Canada, 2004; 2006; see also Steinberg et al., 2014). As Eric 
Franckx concludes, 
[The sector] theory seems to exert a mystical attraction as a fall-back position 
whenever the Canadian sovereignty claim over its northern waters [has] to be 
buttressed…. It is obvious that for Canada the notion of [the] sector theory still has 
not totally fallen into oblivion. (Franckx, 1993, 90; see also Pharand, 1988; Rothwell, 
1996) 
 
Notwithstanding the persistence of semi-official appeals to the sectoral principle, most 
official assertions of Canadian sovereignty over Arctic waters, especially since the Second 
World War, have been in line with the more moderated principles detailed in Article 4 of the 
1958 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (United 
Nations, 1958) and, more recently, Article 7 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) (United Nations, 1982). These articles allow States, in some 
circumstances, to draw straight baselines across indented coastlines such that all water landward 
of these baselines is defined as internal waters. In 1985, Canada declared baselines around its 
 9 
entire Arctic archipelago, with the declaration being effective January 1, 1986 (Government of 
Canada, 1985b). 
UNCLOS provides a number of criteria for determining when straight baselines are 
justified:  
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe 
of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines 
joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured…. 
 
The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be 
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters… 
 
The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to 
cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone. (United Nations, 1982, Articles 7(1), 7(3), 7(6)) 
 
In their detailed defenses of Canada’s straight baselines, both Donat Pharand (2007) and Michael 
Byers and Suzanne Lalonde (2009) find that these geographic criteria are met unproblematically 
in the waters amidst Canada’s Arctic islands, notwithstanding the indeterminate nature of such 
terms as “deeply indented and cut into,” “appropriate points,” “any appreciable extent,” and 
“sufficiently closely linked.” Many outside of Canada, however, have disputed this opinion. 
Shortly after the straight baseline declaration went into effect, the United States issued a protest, 
just as it had done with respect to a host of other straight-baseline declarations around the world 
(including earlier declarations made by Canada in its non-Arctic waters). This was followed by a 
protest from the European Community.
2
 U.S. Navy Commander James Kraska is particularly 
strident on this point, declaring that Canada’s Arctic baselines “[violate] virtually every rule 
governing lawfully drawn baselines” (Kraska, 2007, 271). 
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 In addition to these geographic criteria, UNCLOS also identifies some historic use and 
functional integration criteria, most notably in Article 7(5), which states that although functional 
integration is neither necessary nor sufficient for the drawing of straight baselines it can be used 
to support a claim based on geographic criteria: 
Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may 
be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the 
region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by 
long usage. (United Nations, 1982, Article 7(5)) 
 
 
In his discussion of the use criteria, Pharand focuses less on Article 7(5) and more on 
other points in UNCLOS, most notably Article 10, where historic use criteria are referenced in 
the context of the role of straight baselines in marking off bays as internal waters. Pharand finds 
that this use criteria, particularly as it has been implemented through case law, is likely not met 
in the case of Canada’s Arctic waters, in large part because of the history of other States failing 
to recognize this claim. Byers and Lalonde, in contrast, feel that Pharand abandons the historic 
use argument too quickly. They assert that Inuit used the waters of the Passage intensively and 
thus the waters had been incorporated into their sovereign territory. When Inuit sovereignty was 
transferred to Canada, Byers and Lalonde argue, the waters were transferred along with the land. 
 Since evidence of historic use and economic integration is not necessary for drawing 
straight baselines, it would seem that these criteria are irrelevant. However,  
where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in 
article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously 
been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall 
exist in those waters. (United Nations, 1982, Article 8(2)) 
 
In other words, if straight baselines formalize the status of what had previously been considered 
to be internal waters, then the coastal State is granted all the rights that it would normally have in 
internal waters. This is the situation that Canada claims applies in its northern waters. If, 
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however, the internal waters designated by a straight baseline are waters that historically had not 
been “considered” as such, then – even if those baselines are recognized as legitimate due to 
geographical criteria – the coastal State’s rights within the newly enclosed waters are to be the 
same as if those waters were territorial sea (the portion of ocean-space within 12nm of the 
coastline or baseline) and the coastal State would be required to permit innocent passage by 
another country’s vessel. 
This distinction is significant because, although the innocent passage regime grants 
considerable powers to coastal States, these powers still are less than those granted to States over 
their internal waters. Therefore, both Byers and Lalonde and Pharand go to great lengths to 
demonstrate that the waters within the Canadian straight baselines are historic internal waters 
and thus are subject to the full exercise of State authority. However, they go about this in 
different ways. As indicated above, Byers and Lalonde integrate historic use into the core of their 
argument for baselines through their appeal to the ways in which Inuit have assimilated (often 
frozen) water into their livelihoods. In making this case, they echo an assertion frequently made 
by Canadian officials concerning the unique territorial properties of Arctic ice. For instance, in 
his 1985 speech announcing straight baselines in the Canadian Arctic, Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Joe Clark told Parliament: 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea and ice. It 
extends without interruption to the seaward facing coasts of the Arctic islands. These 
islands are joined, and not divided, by the waters between them. They are bridged for 
most of the year by ice. From time immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and 
occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land. (Clark, 1987, 270) 
 
In 2008, this justification was reiterated by an official at Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade: 
We’re dealing with virtually the world’s only large archipelago, certainly the world’s 
only large archipelago, which has ice-covered areas throughout its surface. The 
 12 
question is what is the status of that ice vis-à-vis the land around it…At some point 
we may end up before an international court [and] we will bring evidence that shows 
the people of the Canadian North – Canadian citizens – in the winter time have 
treated the ice exactly the same as the land, and we’ll make a very strong argument 
for that. (quoted in Gerhardt et al., 2010, 994) 
 
As Kraska notes, this argument is legally suspect. For purposes of defining territory, 
UNCLOS makes no distinction between liquid and frozen water: 
Some governments have taken the view that the ice itself can be occupied, 
converting frozen water into a sort of “ice territory” with attendant rights. This is a 
purely theoretical invention that has no basis in either customary international law or 
the Law of the Sea Convention. There is no authority or provision in the Convention 
to assimilate ice-covered water as “territory” and thereby claim a baseline at the 
point where the ice meets liquid water. Moreover, there is an impracticality to such 
an approach, since the location and shape of the ice is constantly changing. (Kraska, 
2007, 270) 
 
Kraska here echoes Christopher Joyner, who over twenty years earlier wrote: 
High seas remain free and open for use by any State, irrespective of whether the 
surface is liquid or solid. Ice-covered high seas are susceptible neither to sovereign 
claim nor national appropriation by a coastal State. The fact that the Arctic Ocean is 
substantially covered with ice cannot ipso facto divorce it from the normal legal 
status of being high seas. The frozen surface of the sea does not convert the legal 
status of seawater merely because it has become temporarily solid and partially 
capable of physical occupation. (Joyner, 1991, 224; see also Moore, 2010) 
 
 
 Since Pharand excludes historic use from his justification for straight baselines he avoids 
making any assertions about the territorial status of ice (although he does note, inter alia, that 
“the quasi-permanency of the ice over the enclosed waters bolsters the physical unity of land and 
sea” (Pharand, 2007, 19)). However, he still is faced with the problem of asserting that the waters 
enclosed by straight baselines are historic Canadian internal waters. He makes this case by 
arguing that when Canada established straight baselines in 1986 it was neither a party to the 1958 
United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (which had a similar 
clause asserting that innocent passage must be allowed through non-historic internal waters 
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(United Nations, 1958, Article 5(2)) nor was this Convention accepted as customary law. 
Therefore, when UNCLOS entered into force in 1996, the waters within the straight baselines 
had been “considered” internal for eleven years, and when Canada acceded to UNCLOS in 2003 
they had been so for nineteen years. Apparently, that is “historic” enough for Pharand. However 
his argument seems particularly weak given that, as we have seen, the 1985 straight baselines 
declaration was itself contested and this would seem to diminish Canada’s claim that the 
designated internal waters “had…previously been considered as such” (United Nations, 1982, 
Article 8(2); see also, United Nations, 1962). 
In addition Kraska points to a practical problem with Pharand’s argument: 
Some suggest that straight baselines made by a nation before 1982 [when UNCLOS 
was finalized, or before 1996 when it went into force, or before when a country 
acceded to the convention – author] have special status and should be considered 
permissible. This approach is unconvincing; otherwise, the entire range of excessive 
maritime claims predating the 1982 Convention similarly would be permissible—
creating a global crazy quilt of conflicting maritime claims and defeating the purpose 
of the Convention as “one gigantic package deal.” (Kraska, 2007, 271) 
 
In summary, serious questions can be raised about the Canadian position that the waters of the 
Northwest Passage are Canada’s internal waters, and in particular that they are historic internal 
waters.  
B. International Strait 
According to Satya Nandan, one of the key architects of UNCLOS, “The regime for passage 
through straits used for international navigation was the most contentious issue before the 
[UNCLOS] Conference” (Nandan, 2009, 57). For straits that were at least 24nm in width across 
their entire length, there was no issue; a State’s territorial sea extends to 12nm from a coastline, 
so any strait that is never less than 24 nm wide will have a high-seas corridor running through its 
middle, and in this high-seas corridor all vessels would necessarily be allowed passage without 
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the risk of interference from coastal States. The situation is different, however, for straits that 
have at least one segment that is located entirely within a coastal State’s territorial sea or non-
historic internal waters. In these cases, under the innocent passage regime that normally would 
apply in such waters, the coastal State would have the right to prevent passage by any vessel that 
it deemed not innocent and to temporarily suspend innocent passage rights.  
States involved in long-distance navigation and the projection of naval power around the 
world (most notably, the United States) expressed a need for a special regime for international 
straits that would further limit the ability of coastal States to impede transit. Thus was born the 
“transit passage” regime, spelled out in Articles 37 through 44 of UNCLOS, which restricts 
coastal State regulatory rights to four specifically enumerated areas: ensuring safe navigation; 
controlling pollution; regulating fishing; and preventing smuggling (United Nations, 1982, 
Article 42(1)).  Even in these areas, coastal States’ regulations are to be limited to those that 
facilitate the non-discriminatory enforcement of international standards and coastal States are 
banned from imposing any regulations that would “have the practical effect of denying, 
hampering or impairing the right of transit passage” (United Nations, 1982, Article 42(2)). In 
addition, unlike under the innocent passage regime that prevails in portions of the territorial sea 
(or non-historic internal waters) that are not part of an international strait, coastal states that abut 
international straits have no right to prevent transit passage by warships (or airplanes) that are 
not posing an active threat and they have no right to demand that submarines make their presence 
known and travel at the surface. 
 Some questions remain regarding whether the international strait transit passage regime 
trumps Article 234 of UNCLOS, which permits States that abut waters that are ice-covered for 
most of the year to enact special environmental protections out to the limits of their 200nm 
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exclusive economic zones and which Canada has implemented through the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) (Government of Canada, 1985a). Although UNCLOS does 
not state explicitly that Article 234 rights do not apply to international straits, potentially any 
restriction beyond the four very specific ones enumerated in Article 42 could be seen as 
“[having] the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage” 
and therefore not be permissible. Byers and Lalonde (2009) hold that the applicability of Article 
234 to international straits is “unclear” and they therefore caution that designation of the Passage 
as an international strait could leave Canada without adequate ability to protect its adjacent 
waters. Pharand, although also acknowledging that there is some ambiguity, ultimately adopts 
the opposite interpretation. For him, the absence of any clause that explicitly excludes Article 
234 from international straits (in contrast with some of the other articles which are explicitly 
declared inapplicable to international straits) reveals that “the special jurisdiction conferred on 
Canada by the ice-covered areas provision would not be limited by an internationalization of the 
Passage” (Pharand, 2007, 48). Donald McRae goes even further than Pharand, stating 
unequivocally:  
The powers that Canada has in respect of ice-covered areas under Article 234 of the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea would still be applicable [if the Northwest 
Passage were defined as an international strait]. That is to say, the rules relating to 
transit passage are still subject to the authority of the coastal state to regulate in 
respect of ice-covered areas. (McRae, 2007, 19) 
 
Statements made by the United States in its opposition to NORDREG, Canada’s mandatory 
registration scheme for ships entering the waters covered by the AWPPA, suggest that the U.S. 
position is that Article 234 protections may be applied to international straits by adjacent coastal 
states, but only if they are adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization 
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so as to ensure that they serve to enable, and not hinder, transit passage (Embassy of the United 
States of America in Canada, 2010). 
 Notwithstanding these debates regarding what regulations may be applied in international 
straits, the bigger debate, for now at least, is over what constitutes an international strait. As 
Kraska (2007) explains, during the UNCLOS negotiations Canada proposed an explicit 
definition that referred to historic as well as potential use, but this was rejected. Instead, the 
closest thing to a definition occurs in Article 37, which notes that the transit passage regime 
applies to “straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone” 
(United Nations, 1982, Article 37). 
 Pharand, and other Canadian scholars who have followed Pharand’s lead, argue that the 
phrase “which are used” in Article 37 refers to present, not potential, use and that furthermore 
there is an accepted definition of an international strait in customary international law, derived 
from the International Court of Justice’s decision in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case, between the 
United Kingdom and Albania. In the Corfu Channel decision, the International Court established 
a two-part test that involves both geographic and functional criteria. Pharand acknowledges that 
the Passage meets the geographic criteria for an international strait but, through a detailed 
reconstruction of every voyage that had occurred to date through the Passage (as of 2007), he 
argues that the Northwest Passage has not seen functional use as an international strait. Therefore, 
he concludes, it should not, at present, be subject to the transit passage regime that is applied to 
international straits (Pharand, 2007). 
 Kraska’s response is to simply ignore the Corfu Channel Case and the two-pronged test 
that Pharand claims has been accepted into customary international law. Indeed, after reaffirming 
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that the Northwest Passage meets the geographic criteria that appear in Article 37, Kraska 
bluntly asserts, “The test is geographical, not functional” and at this point he concludes his 
discussion of the matter (Kraska, 2007, 274). Kraska’s rejection of the Canadian position is 
rather unconvincing, however, because 1) ignoring the Corfu Channel Case is hardly a 
systematic rebuttal, 2) it is inconsistent with the enthusiasm that Kraska and others associated 
with the U.S. government generally have for customary international law when discussing 
maritime issues (an outgrowth of the United States’ failure to ratify UNCLOS), and 3) in contrast 
to Canada’s straight baselines assertion, in which the U.S. protest was joined by a protest from 
the European Community, the United States is alone in publicly asserting that the Northwest 
Passage is an international strait and in claiming that the only test for determining this is 
geographical.
3
 
C. Territorial Sea 
As the above discussion suggests, there are significant weaknesses to both the Canadian and U.S. 
positions. There is good reason to contest Canada’s claims that the waters are internal, and, 
especially, historic internal waters, and there is good reason to contest the Unites States’ claim 
that these waters meet the legal standards for an international strait. This then leads to the 
question: What if the Passage is neither an international strait nor Canada’s historic internal 
waters? 
 
[INSERT Figure 1] 
 
 Under the “normal” division of the ocean, areas that are between 12 and 200 nm from the 
coast (or baseline) are part of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For purposes of navigation, 
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however, the EEZ designation is irrelevant since high seas navigational freedoms apply there 
(although some limited interdiction rights do apply in the contiguous zone, between 12 and 24 
nm). Water that is less than 12 nm from the coast is classified as a nation’s territorial sea, in 
which UNCLOS’ innocent passage regime applies. In fact, however, so long as there is some 
point in a semi-enclosed body of water that is less than 24 nm wide, this distinction between 
waters that are within 12 nm of the coast and those that are beyond 12nm is largely immaterial. 
In such cases – and the Northwest Passage would be one such case if it were neither Canada’s 
internal waters nor an international strait – coastal States can exercise control over portions that 
are less than 24 nm as “choke points,” effectively giving the entire water body the character of 
territorial sea. In other words, as Figure 1 illustrates, if both Canada’s internal waters claim and 
the United States’ international strait assertion were found to be invalid, or, for that matter, if 
Canada’s internal waters claim based on straight baselines was found to be valid but to not 
reflect the historic use of the waters, the Passage would become effectively a component of 
Canada’s territorial sea. 
 Others have identified options between the extremes of international strait and internal 
waters, the Scylla and Charybdis referred to at the beginning of this article. Franklyn Griffiths 
(1987a), for instance, identifies five potential futures for the Passage’s legal status, including two 
that derive from its designation as neither an international strait nor Canada’s internal waters 
(Griffiths, 1987a). Likewise, Ted McDorman (2009, 244) briefly considers what he calls the 
“none of the above” option. However, probably the most detailed discussion of this option is 
undertaken by Donald McRae (2007). As McRae notes, from the Canadian perspective the actual 
rights that would accrue to Canada in the Passage if it were designated as territorial sea would 
not be that different than if it were designated as internal waters. A similar sentiment is 
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expressed by Suzanne Lalonde and Frédéric Lasserre, who deemphasize the differences between 
“a coastal state’s sovereign control over its internal waters and the many rights and prerogatives 
recognized to it over the innocent passage of foreign ships in its territorial sea” while positing 
that there is a “marked contrast [between these packages of coastal state rights and] the regime of 
transit passage that applies within international straits” (Lalonde and Lasserre, 2013, 34). This 
suggests that it may be pragmatically advisable for Canada to accept recognition of a territorial 
sea designation in return for the United States abandoning the much less palatable international 
strait position. 
Furthermore, specific conditions in the Northwest Passage could enhance Canada’s 
stewardship rights over these territorial waters. As McRae notes, Canada could effectively apply 
internal waters-level regulations to any ship traveling to a Canadian port through the 
establishment of domestic port standards, since ports are always considered internal waters. This 
point has taken on increased saliency since 2009 when the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment found that, for the foreseeable future, the vast majority of shipping in the 
Northwest Passage will be port-based destination traffic, as opposed to through transit (Arctic 
Council, 2009). Commercial ships traveling through the territorial waters of the Northwest 
Passage could be further regulated through the special rights granted to Canada through Article 
234 of UNCLOS. Additionally, at some point in the relatively near future, regulations for ships 
of all nations operating in polar waters likely will be enhanced through a multilaterally 
negotiated (within the International Maritime Organization) Polar Code.  
 Even for McRae, however, the territorial sea option is clearly a second-choice alternative, 
and one that should be pursued only if the internal waters claim gets invalidated by a judicial 
authority. In contrast, the suggestion here is that the territorial sea option may be politically 
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optimal for both Canada and the United States and that pursuing it could bring about long-term 
stability for users of the Passage and, more broadly, for United States-Canada relations.  
III. Canadian and U.S. Political Objectives 
As several scholars have noted, the governments of Canada and the United States approach the 
Arctic, and, more specifically, the Northwest Passage, from different starting points, with 
different levels of interest, and with different concerns and policy objectives (Bergh, 2012; 
Elliott-Meisel, 2009). While these distinctive perspectives of Canada and the United States make 
dialogue difficult, they also make compromise possible. 
A. Canadian Objectives 
In Canada, the North has an iconic role as the hearth of the nation. Although few southern 
Canadians have actually ventured to the Canadian Arctic, the North is mythologized as defining 
the essence of Canadian identity (Grace, 2001). Furthermore, because the North is understood to 
be a region of islands, waterways, peninsulas, and coastlines, it is perceived by Canadians as 
giving their country a fundamentally archipelagic character (whether or not the country meets 
UNCLOS’ definition of an archipelagic nation) (Vannini et al., 2009). Thus, popular 
affirmations of sovereignty and Canadian identity frequently explicitly link expressions of 
nationhood with statements and actions that affirm the territorial integrity of Canada’s Arctic 
waters. This can be seen in the aforementioned statements by Ambassador Pearson and Minister 
Clark (both of whom subsequently went on to become prime ministers) as well as those by 
Foreign Minister MacKay. Boosted by a longstanding concern among Canadian leaders to 
reaffirm that sovereignty extends to the nation’s northern reaches (Grant, 2010), Canadians 
maintain a construction of the North that is proudly maritime, as is evidenced in the extensive 
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public relations campaigns that surround annual Arctic naval exercises and in Prime Minister 
Harper’s penchant for publicity photos in which he places a foot in Arctic waters (Dodds, 2012). 
 In this context, Canadian policies toward the Arctic are created in a vortex of myths about 
Canada’s past, ideals about its future, and specific, concrete policy goals for the present. For 
Canada, the Northwest Passage is, as Franklyn Griffiths has stated, “where vision and illusion 
meet” (Griffiths, 1987b). Thus, there is little point in debating, for instance, whether, the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act was an attempt by the Canadian government to utilize 
environmental protection concerns as a means for affirming Canadian territorial security 
ambitions or whether the government was asserting territorial authority in order to attain 
pollution-prevention goals. In fact, the two objectives support each other as they work together to 
maintain the integrity of the “True North Strong and Free,”4 a pristine and unsullied universe of 
land, water, ice, and indigenous peoples that grounds southern Canadians’ identity in a totem of 
perceived northern exoticism, inaccessibility, and harshness (Grace, 2001).  
The North is therefore constructed by Canada as a vulnerable, yet essential space to be 
defended (Dittmer et al., 2011; Dodds, 2010). Canadians debate whether this defense can best be 
achieved through investments in soft power (e.g. the development and integration of northern 
communities and peoples) or hard power (e.g. increasing military capabilities), but few Canadian 
politicians would question that an enhanced presence in the North is a key means toward the goal 
of affirming Canada’s integrity as a sovereign nation, distinct from the culturally, economically, 
and militarily dominant United States that lies adjacent to its population centers. As McDorman 
writes, “It is a reality of Canada’s domestic politics that the sitting government must be seen to 
be protecting Canadian sovereignty and standing-up to the United States, regardless of the 
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existence of a US provocation” (McDorman, 2010, 242), and this extends to the Northwest 
Passage as one seemingly threatened component of Canada’s sacred Arctic patrimony. 
B. U.S. Objectives 
Although the United States Arctic Region Policy states, “The United States is an Arctic nation, 
with varied and compelling interests in that region” (Bush, 2009, para. II.A), in fact little 
attention is paid nationally to Arctic affairs, and even less is paid to Arctic security issues. As 
Kraska wryly remarks, “As a nation, the United States views the Arctic with relatively minimal 
interest compared to every other Arctic nation … The United States is not focused on the Arctic, 
and, for the most part, other countries prefer it to be that way” (Kraska, 2012, 244). 
 In fact, Kraska may be overstating his case here, perhaps due to his particular focus on 
security issues. The United States is increasingly focused on the Arctic, but not as a fundamental 
locus of security or sovereignty. It is telling, for instance, that in hearings held in 2012 by the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning accession to UNCLOS, fourteen of the 
sixteen speakers who spoke in favor of accession specifically pointed to the growing importance 
of the Arctic maritime region as one of the reasons why the United States should join the 
convention (United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2012).
5
 However, it is equally 
telling that when these military, diplomatic, and industry officials made the link between 
UNCLOS accession and U.S. interests in the Arctic it was almost always with reference to how 
UNCLOS accession would permit the United States to claim resource extraction rights on Arctic 
portions of the outer continental shelf. Only two of the speakers referred to navigational 
opportunities and related security challenges in the Arctic, and only one of these, former Deputy 
Secretary of State John Negroponte, specifically mentioned the Northwest Passage.
6
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Given the lack of U.S. interest in the Arctic as a security concern and the peripheral 
location of the Arctic in U.S. identity, both of which sharply contrast with the Canadian situation, 
the main concern of the United States regarding the Northwest Passage is as a source of 
precedent for other parts of the world. As historian Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel has noted, “The 
Passage is an issue of precedent and principle, not one of national security” for the United States, 
with the primary concern being that recognition of the Passage as Canada’s internal waters could 
set a dangerous precedent for other international straits in which transit passage is guaranteed 
under UNCLOS (Elliot-Meisel, 1999, 419). Secondarily, recognition of Canada’s internal waters 
claim could be seen as an affirmation of the legitimacy of Canada’s Arctic straight baselines, and 
this too is something that the United States seeks to avoid because of the precedent-setting 
impact that it could have on the U.S.’ overriding interest in navigational freedom. 
Since 2001, a number of Canadian scholars, joined by former U.S. Ambassador to 
Canada Paul Cellucci, have argued that if the United States is concerned about homeland 
security then its interests would be better met through Canadian control of the Northwest Passage, 
so that Canadian forces could interdict potential terrorist threats that might seek to use the 
Passage as an entry point into North America (Byers, 2009; Byers and Lalonde, 2009; Griffiths, 
2003). This argument, however, appears to have achieved little traction in Washington. Although 
the 2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy includes its discussion of the Northwest Passage within the 
section on “National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic,” the connection 
between the Northwest Passage and homeland security is made not by pointing to a direct threat 
to the homeland from a poorly policed Northwest Passage but rather by pointing to the 
precedent-setting function that the Northwest Passage could have in other straits that are 
important for U.S. security: 
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Freedom of the seas is a top national priority.  The Northwest Passage is a strait used 
for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for 
international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through 
those straits.  Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in 
the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, 
including through strategic straits. (Bush, 2009, para. III.B.5; see also Kraska, 2007) 
 
Certainly the Arctic Region Policy’s integration of the discussion of the Northwest Passage with 
that of the Northern Sea Route, where there certainly is no threat of cross-border incursions, 
indicates that the United States’ primary concern is with transit passage in general, not any 
dangers arising from the Passage’s proximity. Thus, to the extent that the United States sees the 
Northwest Passage as a security concern, it is in relation to the overall security of U.S. interests 
as a maritime nation and naval power, not through any direct threat to the homeland. 
In 2003, Rob Huebert wrote, “The past actions by the United States clearly demonstrate 
that Americans feel stronger about the principle of freedom of navigation through international 
straits over any security benefits achieved through a Canadianized Northwest Passage” (Huebert, 
2003, 306). The explicit disavowal of Cellucci’s argument by his successor (Struck, 2006), the 
failure of military and Coast Guard leaders to identify the Northwest Passage as a potential 
security threat when testifying about U.S. Arctic interests at the 2012 Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings, and the folding of Northwest Passage homeland security concerns within 
freedom of navigation priorities in the Arctic Policy Strategy all suggest that this remains the 
case. 
C. A Third Option: Agreeing to Disagree 
While the United States and Canada have vastly different perspectives on the Northwest Passage, 
their priorities are not directly opposed to one another. It is not as if, for instance, the United 
States seeks transit through the Passage and Canada seeks to close it off. In fact, the United 
States has no strong interest (for now, at least) in making commercial transits through the 
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passage and Canada has no particular desire to ban transit. At a practical level, both nations agree 
that the Passage can and should be used for well-regulated shipping. The problem is that Canada 
approaches this problem within the political context of protecting the sovereignty of Canadian 
territory while the dominant context for the United States is that of guaranteeing worldwide 
navigational freedoms. Thus, the two countries tend to talk past each other when addressing the 
Northwest Passage. This situation makes dialogue difficult, but not as difficult as would be the 
case were their policy goals in direct opposition to one another. Elliot-Meisel (2009), in 
particular, stresses that, given that the two countries’ priorities are not directly in opposition to 
one another, and given the generally warm relations that otherwise prevail, some form of 
compromise should be possible. 
 One tactic for achieving agreement would be for Canada to convince the United States to 
adopt its priorities because they are in the United States’ best interests. Byers and Lalonde (2009) 
pursue this line of reasoning, but the failure of officials in the United States (other than the 
recently deceased Paul Cellucci) to adopt the homeland security perspective suggests that this 
tactic will not be successful. Conversely, it seems highly unlikely that the United States would be 
able to convince Canada – a country without a significant merchant marine or blue-water navy – 
that its primary interest lies in preserving transit passage through the world’s international straits. 
A more promising path to consensus has been proposed by a number of Canadian 
scholars who suggest that the two countries can break the current stalemate by focusing on 
practical arrangements for ensuring safe use of the waters (Griffiths, 2009; Lackenbauer, 2012; 
McDorman, 2010).
7
 They argue that the two countries’ practical interests in the Northwest 
Passage are not far apart, and that this will become apparent to individuals on both sides once 
they disassociate management issues from larger concerns regarding precedent and principle. 
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These scholars therefore suggest that both countries stand to gain from avoiding direct 
negotiations, as a formal, high-level bargaining environment inevitably would force each country 
to defend its principles. Instead, the argument goes, the two countries should maintain the status 
quo whereby they “agree to disagree” on major principles while working through the technical 
details required for orderly and safe use of the Passage. As McDorman writes, 
The way forward regarding the Northwest Passage is to concentrate on the vessels 
potentially engaged in use of the Passage and other Arctic Ocean waters, ensuring 
safer and cleaner navigation, rather than focusing on the coastal State’s rights to 
control access to the Passage. (McDorman, 2010, 249) 
 
 
Proponents of this strategy note that historically the two countries have gone to great 
lengths to avoid outright confrontation in Arctic waters. For instance, while the transit of the U.S. 
tanker SS Manhattan through the Northwest Passage in 1969 was generally perceived in Canada 
as an intentional challenge to Canada’s claims, in fact Canada had not at the time formally 
established baselines around the archipelago or passed the AWPPA, and the planned route was 
specifically designed to keep the ship in waters that were more than 6nm from land (which, at the 
time, was the limit to Canada’s territorial sea). Likewise, the Canadian government’s actions 
(and military expenditures) in the North have fallen short of the populist rhetoric that politicians 
have articulated in order to placate (or inflame) their populace (Byers and Lalonde, 2009; Elliot-
Meisel, 2009; Griffiths, 2009; Lackenbauer, 2012; McDorman, 2010). 
For a model of how this “agreement to disagree” might proceed, supporters point to the 
1988 Canada-United States Agreement on Arctic Cooperation (the Icebreaker Agreement), 
which was enacted following the transit of another U.S. ship through the Northwest Passage, the 
USCGC Polar Sea (Governments of Canada and the United States, 1988). Under this agreement, 
the United States agrees to ask permission before a Coast Guard icebreaker enters the Northwest 
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Passage and Canada agrees to grant that permission, all with the understanding that neither side 
is making any concessions regarding its position on the legal status of the waters. Griffiths, in 
particular, has proposed that this agreement could be expanded to cover a broader range of 
vessels (Griffiths, 2003) and that it thereby could serve as a model for “a set of cooperative 
arrangements that deepen and widen the Canada-US agreement to disagree on the Northwest 
Passage” (Griffiths, 2009, 109). 
While the “agree to disagree” approach is appealing for its potential to resolve difference 
without direct confrontation, it has been criticized by Byers and Lalonde (2009) and, somewhat 
less directly, by Elliot-Meisel (2009) for a number of reasons. First, the principle of “agreeing to 
disagree” assumes a small number of actors who have a degree of trust and mutually supportive 
interest that enables them to accept tacit understandings. Such a system may function in a 
bilateral environment between two States that have extensive interaction and generally friendly 
relations, but it is much less likely to function in a multilateral arena. As the 2013 admission of 
six new non-Arctic states as permanent observers on the Arctic Council illustrates, the Arctic 
increasingly is an arena in which a wide range of actors, including many from outside the region, 
have interests. At present, outsiders’ interests are primarily in mineral extraction opportunities 
and, secondarily, the Northern Sea Route, and few countries besides Canada and the United 
States have expressed an interest in using the waters of the Northwest Passage. However, as 
northern Canada attracts foreign direct investment from outside the region (e.g. the 70 percent 
stake that Luxemburg-based ArcelorMittal holds in Nunavut’s Mary River iron ore mine) this is 
sure to change, and it will change even more dramatically should the Passage become a 
commercially viable trans-continental shipping corridor.  
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Thus, Byers and Lalonde, although acknowledging that the Icebreaker Agreement 
“created a status quo that might have solved the entire problem indefinitely,” note that this is no 
longer the case due to “the sudden, unanticipated effects of climate change two decades later” 
(Byers and Lalonde, 2009, 1161). Elsewhere, Lalonde reflects on how these changes have made 
bilateral approaches to governing the Passage obsolete, noting that change in the region “has 
completely changed the nature of the [Northwest Passage] problem. This is no longer simply a 
bilateral issue, if it ever was” (Lalonde, 2008, 10, quoted in Elliot-Meisel, 2009, n. 101). 
 As part of their argument encouraging Canadians to support the “agree to disagree” 
approach, both Griffiths and McDorman note that the United States has acknowledged the 
validity of UNCLOS Article 234 and Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 
including as they apply to the Northwest Passage, and they contend that this will provide a 
foundation for the two nations adopting practical management policies that will reaffirm 
Canada’s effective control of the Passage. Griffiths points to the United States’ support for 
Article 234 in the UNCLOS negotiations as a “triumph” for Canada, as it effectively “made 
consensual” the AWPPA in spite of its unilateral origins (Griffiths, 2009, 112). McDorman 
similarly celebrates the fact that “the United States acknowledges that US commercial vessels 
are ‘subject to’ the standards and requirements of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
[and that] the United States has made no distinction regarding application of the Arctic Waters 
legislation to the Northwest Passage as opposed to other Canadian waters” (McDorman, 2010, 
245-246). 
 Griffiths and McDorman may however be premature in the celebration of a (pro-
Canadian) consensus. While the United States has indeed acknowledged the legitimacy of both 
Article 234 and the AWPPA, contestation remains over the details. For instance, while 
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McDorman cites a 1992 U.S. Department of State policy document that states, “The United 
States considers U.S. vessels subject to [the AWPPA],” he neglects to note that this sentence is 
preceded by two that express reservations regarding how Canada is applying the legislation: 
The United States continues to object to the application of the [AWPPA] in so far as 
it purports to apply to sovereign immune vessels. The United States believes that 
internationally agreed standards should be developed to replace many of the 
unilateral provisions. (United States Department of State, 1992, 73, n. 114) 
 
Since that time, the United States has continued to accept in principle the application of Article 
234 and the AWPPA to the waters of the Northwest Passage, but it continues to conflict with 
Canada on their precise interpretations. This can be seen most recently in the United States’ 
reaction when Canada announced that, as of July 2010, ships entering waters covered by the 
AWPPA would be required to register under Transport Canada’s NORDREGs scheme. In a 
diplomatic note of protest, the U.S. Embassy in Canada asserted that “it continues to be 
concerned that the NORDREGs are inconsistent with important law of the sea principles related 
to navigational rights and freedoms” and that “the United States does not believe that requiring 
permission to transit these areas meets the condition set forth in Article 234 of having due regard 
to navigation” (Embassy of the United States of America in Canada, 2010). In short, while the 
United States and Canada may agree in principle on the legality of Article 234 and its application 
to Canada’s waters via the AWPPA, signification differences of interpretation remain. Given this 
underlying tension, it is not at all clear that an “agreement to disagree” would be strong enough 
to withstand new tensions that could arise from increased use of the passage. 
 A related issue concerns the applicability of Article 234 – and, it follows, the legality of 
the AWPPA – if the waters of the Northwest Passage were to stop being characterized by “the 
presence of ice cover…[for] most of the year.” In fact, there has always been some flexibility in 
defining “the presence of ice cover…[for] most of the year.” Canada’s Ice Service uses a 
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threshold of 10 percent ice-cover for at least six months, but in the past there has been 
consideration of adjusting this threshold upward or downward, depending on political objectives 
(Steinberg et al., 2014). Notwithstanding this flexibility, at some point the level of ice cover 
could become so low that any application of Article 234 would become difficult to justify (Byers 
and Lalonde, 2009; McRae 2007).  
 In fact, in its ongoing attempt to question what it sees as excessive interpretations of 
Article 234 by Canada, the United States has begun to raise the question that Article 234 may no 
longer be applicable to all of Canada’s Arctic waters due to the lack of persistent ice cover. In 
response to a request for public comments after Canada proposed mandatory participation in 
NORDREGs, Eric Benjaminson, the U.S. Embassy’s Minister-Counselor for Economic, Energy, 
and Environment Affairs, raised the following challenge: 
The United States is interested to know the scientific evidence that was considered in 
the development of these proposed regulations. Article 234 is likewise limited to 
“ice-covered areas,” namely those areas covered by ice for “most of the year.” 
Recognizing that the Notice states that “ice levels have recently been observed to be 
at an all-time low,” the United States is likewise interested to know what information 
has been used to determine how this condition has been met through the entire area 
covered by the NORDREG zone. (Benjaminson, 2010) 
 
When the NORDREGs rule was adopted and Benjaminson’s letter was revised into a formal 
diplomatic note of protest (Embassy of the United States of America in Canada, 2010) this 
paragraph was excised from the revision. Presumably, the United States decided that it was not 
prepared to launch what could be read as a direct challenge to the AWPPA. Nonetheless, the 
combination of ongoing diplomatic tensions and diminishing ice cover suggests that for the 
foreseeable future substantial differences will remain between Canada and the United States even 
over practical issues in the management of the Northwest Passage, let alone the more thorny 
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issues of principle and precedent. This suggests that an “agreement to disagree” may not have the 
resilience necessary for accommodating unforeseen challenges. 
 A final reason why differences surrounding management of the Northwest Passage would 
not be settled under an “agreement to disagree” is that, just as the applicability of Article 234 and 
the AWPPA are likely to be contested as Arctic ice melts, Canada’s argument that the Passage is 
not an international strait will lose validity with each successful transit. This eventuality was 
noted by Pharand already in the 1980s, before increased use of the Passage due to climate change 
was seen as imminent (Pharand, 1988). However, it is more immediately pressing now, 
especially in the eyes of Canadians who fear “losing” the Passage to creeping 
internationalization brought about by its increased use as a transit channel (e.g. Huebert, 2003). 
 Each of these points – the emergence of the Northwest Passage as a multilateral problem, 
questions and tensions concerning the applicability and extent of Article 234 and AWPPA 
protections, and the declining power of Canada’s argument that the Passage is not an 
international strait – suggest that tacit acknowledgment between the United States and Canada to 
“agree to disagree” will not bring about the era of conflict-free, consensual management that its 
supporters predict. Tensions would arise as ice melts and uses of the Passage become more 
intense, and this likely would endanger both Canada’s claim that it is not an international strait 
and the United States’ interest in regional stability and the rule of law. A more affirmative 
middle route between Scylla and Charybdis is therefore required.  
IV. Territorial Sea 
McDorman (2010) considers four middle routes that have been proposed for resolving the 
Northwest Passage stalemate: internationalizing the Passage with the engagement of the 
International Maritime Organization, following the model of the Straits of Malacca; creating a 
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joint U.S.-Canadian authority, following the model of the St. Lawrence Seaway; expanding the 
Icebreaker Agreement to cover vessels other than U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers; and 
nationalizing the Passage with the United States recognizing the homeland security benefits to be 
gained through Canadian control. McDorman concludes, however, that none of these options is 
viable, given “the ferocity of Canada’s ‘politics of sovereignty’ and the US attachment to 
navigational freedom and fear of precedent” (McDorman, 2010, 247). He speculates that the first 
three options would be politically unacceptable to Canada while the fourth option would be 
politically unacceptable to the United States. 
 Little attention, however, has been given to another option: classifying the Northwest 
Passage as a component of Canada’s territorial sea. For the United States, the benefit of such a 
strategy would be clear. If the United States’ primary objective in the Northwest Passage is to 
avoid setting a precedent that might reduce transit passage rights in other international straits, 
then it would seem that the second-best solution, almost as good as affirming the Passage’s status 
as an international strait with no special provisions for Canadian authority, would be to assert 
that the Passage is not an international strait. By affirming the Passage’s exceptionalism, to the 
point that it is taken out of the international strait category all together, the United States will 
have effectively insulated whatever regime is adopted in the Northwest Passage from having any 
impact on other straits around the world. Although writing about the impact of designating the 
Passage as Canada’s internal waters, not as territorial sea, Byers and Lalonde’s commentary is 
instructive: 
Although the [United States’] fear that recognizing Canada’s claim would create a 
dangerous precedent is understandable, it is misplaced. The Canadian position does 
not seek to create an exception to the international straits regime. Rather, the position 
is that the Northwest Passage is not and has never been an international strait. (Byers 
and Lalonde, 2009, 1204) 
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Given that the United States’ main concern regarding the Passage is the precedent that it would 
set for other straits, rather than a fear that Canada will not permit U.S. ships to transit Arctic 
waters, there is no need for the United Sates to be concerned about the extra rights that Canada 
would have in these waters should the regime shift from transit passage to innocent passage.
8
  
Furthermore, designation of the Passage as Canada’s territorial sea would bring a number 
of benefits to the United States. Although the United States’ primary concern has been with 
preserving the integrity of the transit passage regime for international straits, it also is concerned 
with limiting straight baseline claims around the world. Canada’s renunciation of its straight 
baselines, which could occur if Canada were to reclassify the waters as territorial sea, would 
serve to buttress the United States’ opposition to straight baselines elsewhere.9 Secondly, 
although the homeland security argument certainly has not emerged as a major concern among 
U.S. policy makers, to the extent that it is a concern at all the designation of the Passage as 
Canada’s territorial sea would provide more protection than would be the case were the Passage 
an international strait. And, relatedly, the recognition of the Passage as Canada’s territorial sea 
could encourage Canada to invest in navigational infrastucture, something from which all 
countries engaged in long-distance trade – including the United States – would benefit. 
For Canada, the designation of the Passage as territorial sea at first appears more 
problematic. After all, if Canada’s goal is to proclaim possession of the North and reaffirm its 
sovereignty in the most definitive, least qualified way, then, at least in a symbolic sense, 
acceptance of a territorial sea designation would be a concession from the present historic 
internal waters claim. In reality, however, a diverse range of Canadian and U.S. scholars 
representing a wide variety of perspectives -- including Griffiths (2009), Kraska (2009), Lalonde 
and Lasserre (2013), McDorman (2009), and McRae (2007) -- have noted that the rights that 
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would accrue to Canada if the Passage were designated as territorial sea would not be very much 
different than would be the case if it were designated as historic internal waters. This would be 
all the more so if Canada unequivocally were to be granted extensive Article 234 rights in its 
Arctic waters. And since much of the United States’ resistance here has been because Canada’s 
efforts to exercise Article 234 rights in the Passage have been bundled with its assertions of 
sovereignty,
10
 it is likely that, in the context of a mutual recognition that the Passage is Canada’s 
territorial sea, the United States’ resistance to what it sees as “excessive” applications of Article 
234 would disappear. 
To be certain, both States would be giving up some rights in these waters were they to 
compromise on a territorial sea designation. The United States would lose the right that it 
currently claims to sail submerged submarines through the Passage, since there is no restriction 
against this in the international strait transit passage regime while “in the territorial sea, 
submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show 
their flag” (United Nations, 1982, Article 20). As both Byers and Lalonde (2009) and McRae 
(2007) note, however, submerged U.S. ships are almost certainly already traversing the Passage, 
notwithstanding Canada’s internal waters claim. Whether or not Canada receives advance notice 
of each transit, both sides apparently have chosen not to publicize these transits so as not to 
inflame the situation. If the Passage were recognized as territorial sea, it would be much easier 
for the United States to notify Canada and for Canada to then exempt the United States from the 
surface-transit requirement without either side making an implicit challenge to the Passage’s 
status. The end result would likely be no significant reduction in U.S. mobility while permitting a 
notification protocol that would affirm Canada’s territorial control over the waters. 
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Just as the United States would – on paper, at least – be surrendering the right that it 
currently claims to sail submerged submarines through the Passage, Canada would be giving up 
the right to apply environmental regulations to vessels with sovereign immunity, since Article 
236 of UNCLOS explicitly protects such vessels from environmental regulations, whether these 
regulations are instituted as part of the general management of the territorial sea or under the 
special Article 234 provisions for ice-covered waters. However, with the broader issues of 
sovereignty and precedent taken off the table through a positive agreement to classify the 
Passage as Canada’s territorial sea, it then might be possible to follow Griffiths’ call for 
expanding the Icebreaker Agreement to other government-sponsored vessels as well as to add 
clauses regulating these ships’ environmental impact.  
Notwithstanding these arguments, one could still maintain that this settlement would be 
politically unacceptable to Canada. Even if it is the case that the substantive reduction in 
Canada’s control over adjacent waters would pale in comparison to the benefits that would 
accrue to both States from a settlement based on a territorial sea designation, one might hold that 
the proposal would be a difficult sell to a Canadian public that puts a priority on “defending its 
sovereignty” in the North. However, while the territorial sea solution could be interpreted by 
Canadians as a retreat from the more robust historic internal waters claim, it equally could be 
seen as a victory. After all, if the two countries were to agree on a territorial sea designation, that 
would involve the United States recognizing that the waters that flow around Canada’s northern 
islands are irreducible extensions of Canada’s territory, something that Canadian nationalists 
have long sought. It seems likely that the Canadian public would focus less on the relatively 
technical distinction between internal waters and territorial sea than on the fact that the United 
States will have recognized the waters amidst the islands of the Canadian North as being under 
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Canadian sovereign control. Indeed, in the long run, consensual recognition of the Passage as 
Canada’s territorial sea would constitute a much more substantial affirmation of Canadian 
sovereignty in the North than could ever result from Canada’s unilateral and contested assertions 
of straight baselines and internal waters.  
V. Conclusion 
Arguably, every water body is both an obstacle and a facilitator of connection. For Odysseus, the 
strait of Scylla and Charybdis was most certainly a barrier; indeed, it was one that could be 
crossed only at considerable expense in human lives. But it was also a passage that enabled 
Odysseus and his ship to get to the other side and meet new challenges. 
 The Northwest Passage has long played a similar role for the nations of North America. 
For centuries, the search for it led to trade, investment, and migration. But it also spawned 
conflict between outsiders seeking routes through the passage and local inhabitants who were 
integrating its waters into their livelihoods, as well as among competing groups of outsiders. 
Most recently, the Northwest Passage has emerged again as a site of division and discord, as 
Canada and the United States duel over whether the Passage should be classified as internal 
waters or an international strait.  
In the Northwest Passage, however, unlike in the passage navigated by Odysseus, there is 
an opportunity for navigating down a middle path that minimizes risk. The consensual 
designation of the Passage as Canada’s territorial sea would be consistent with UNCLOS while 
meeting the policy objectives of both countries. The potential for designating the Northwest 
Passage as Canada’s territorial sea therefore merits our attention, before the Passage becomes a 
commercial transit corridor and, potentially, a site of intensified conflict. 
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1
 The other major (or potentially major) sea route through Arctic coastal waters is the Northern 
Sea Route, off the northern coast of Russia and connecting the Pacific with the Baltic Sea. While 
there are some common issues of concern in the two sets of northern shipping lanes, there are 
enough differences – geographic, political, and legal – to merit separate consideration. This 
article focuses exclusively on the Northwest Passage.   
2
 Both letters are reprinted in Byers and Lalonde (2009, 1162). 
3
 There is some dispute about this final point. McDorman (2009, 236) and Byers and Lalonde 
(2009, 1193-1194) both state that the United States is alone in asserting that the only criterion is 
geographic, while Kraska (2007, 259) holds that the European Union has taken this position as 
well. However, the Washington Post article that Kraska references when making this point 
(Struck, 2006) does not mention the European Union, and Kraska offers no other evidence to 
support his statement. 
4
 This is a line from Canada’s national anthem, and is frequently used by students of Canadian 
culture to ground their discussion of the North’s role in Canadian identity (e.g. Shields, 1991). 
5
 The only two speakers who did not mention the Arctic were Admiral Samuel Locklear from the 
U.S. Navy, who spoke from his perspective in the U.S. Pacific Command, and Lowell McAdam 
from the telecommunications firm Verizon, who spoke on how UNCLOS accession would 
facilitate protection of submarine cables, a topic that is not relevant to the Arctic since there are 
no cables there. 
6
 In listing a series of benefits that UNCLOS ratification would bring to the United States in the 
Arctic, Negroponte mentioned that accession would give the United States standing “to 
challenge Canada’s assertion that the Northwest Passage falls within its internal waters.” The 
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other speaker who alluded to security concerns in the Arctic was Air Force General Charles 
Jacoby, Commander of the Northern Command. Although General Jacoby did not refer 
specifically to the Northwest Passage he did remark, “As a combatant commander with mission 
responsibilities for homeland defense and civil support in the maritime approaches to the 
homeland with an increasingly accessible Arctic Ocean, I fully support our nation’s accession to 
the Convention.”  
7
 Elliot-Meisel (2009) makes similar arguments although, unlike Griffiths, Lackenbauer, and 
McDorman, she supports direct negotiations between Canada and the United States. 
8
 The one exception here potentially could be for military ships, discussed below. 
9 Alternately, Canada could achieve territorial sea designation by maintaining its straight 
baseline claim but acknowledging that the waters enclosed by these baselines are not 
historically internal water. Although this alternate strategy would deprive the United States 
of a victory in its campaign against straight baselines, it might be more palatable to 
Canadians since it would leave unchanged the map showing the extent of Canadian 
territory. 
10
 For instance, the U.S. Embassy’s note of protest to Canada over its requirement of mandatory 
NORDREG registration concludes with a paragraph that suggests that the U.S. opposition is not 
simply about the meaning of Article 234 but how, in Canada, it is being conflated with, and used 
as a instrument to promote, a broader campaign to internalize Arctic waters: “The United States 
noted with concern the references to ‘sovereignty’ in the statements accompanying the 
regulations. The United States wishes to note that the NORDREGs do not, and cannot as a matter 
of law, increase the ‘sovereignty’ of Canada over any territory or marine area” (Embassy of the 
United States of America in Canada, 2010). 
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